We consider a scenario in which a database stores sensitive data of users and an analyst wants to estimate statistics of the data. The users may suffer a cost when their data are used in which case they should be compensated. The analyst wishes to get an accurate estimate, while the users want to maximize their utility. We want to design a mechanism that can estimate statistics accurately without compromising users' privacy.
INTRODUCTION
Using the Internet, it is fairly easy to collect sensitive personal data. Online service providers implicitly compensate users who provide their personal data, by offering improved services based on their data. However, this implicit exchange may not be fair to the individual, since different people may have different costs -a loss in expected utility over future events -for use of their data. Moreover, companies rarely give well-defined guarantees concerning data privacy and compensation. When the compensation is less than the individual's perceived cost, the individual may choose not to participate. Here, we explore mechanisms to fairly compensate individuals for use of their personal data.
In order to motivate users to participate in a mechanism, the payment to a user should be at least the cost to the user. Thus, the mechanism should learn information about users' costs. Ghosh and Roth [Ghosh and Roth 2011] initiate a study of this problem. Their mechanism asks users to report their costs for the use of their data to estimate statistics, and then selects some of the users (based on their stated costs) to determine the statistics, and pays these users accordingly. This mechanism is problematic when costs and personal data are correlated, since users may be reluctant to reveal their costs if they are not guaranteed adequate compensation up front. For example, suppose that a database indicates whether a vehicle has been damaged. When the database can be publicly accessed, the owner of a damaged car cannot sell the car for the same price as the price of an undamaged car. Thus, his cost for revealing data is higher than the owner of an undamaged car. Revealing information about the costs may also reveal information about whether the car is damaged. Thus, it is important to also guarantee privacy of individual payments.
We study this problem where costs are correlated with data. We model this correlation by assuming that a user's unknown data determines a distribution from a set of accurate and publicly known distributions and the user's cost is drawn from that distribution. We propose a model of a privacy preserving mechanism where users are compensated whenever they reveal any information about their data to the mechanism, whether directly, or indirectly by revealing their costs. In this model, we design a Bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism, which produces accurate statistics and protects the privacy of data and costs.
Problem Setting. There are n users, which we call players, denoted by [n] . Each player has sensitive data D i ∈ [h], stored in a database D ∈ [h] n . Initially D i is the private information of player i. However, since D i is also in the database, it's value may be verified with player i's permission. In addition, player i has a value for his loss of privacy of his data. This value v i is private to player i, but it is correlated with D i . This correlation is modeled as follows: If D i = t ∈ [h] then v i ∼ F t , where F t is a distribution of privacy costs for players of type t that is known to all players and the mechanism. F t correctly represents the distributions of costs of type t players.
A query is a function Q : [h] n → R, mapping a database to a response. An example of a query is "what is the number of people i in the database D with D i = j?". A data analyst wants Q(D). Since the data are sensitive, the data analyst accesses the database through a privacy preserving algorithm A. Therefore, the data analyst does not receive Q(D) but receives an estimate A(D). To ensure the estimate is accurate, the error |Q(D) − A(D)| should be small with high probability.
Differential privacy, introduced in [Dwork et al. 2006] , is an accepted way to measure privacy and privacy preserving algorithms. Two databases D and D ′ are adjacent if they differ in only one entry. An algorithm A satisfies ǫ-differential privacy, where Although an ǫ-differentially private algorithm can protect sensitive data, if a player allows his data to be used, he may incur a cost. We model this cost as linear in the privacy loss ǫ and his expected cost v i . 1 Thus, for player i to agree to the use of his data, his expected payment should be at least ǫv i .
A mechanism specifies a set of actions that players can take. The players take actions based on their data and private costs. Thus, the input of the mechanism is a database and a vector of actions. The outputs are an estimateŝ and a payment vector p = (p 1 , . . . , p n ). Since player i has a linear cost ǫv i , the utility of player i is p i − ǫv i if 1 We can view this cost as due to the change in his utility from future events that depend on the answer he gives to the analyst. This cost is approximately linear in ǫ and his expected utility, denoted by v i . Let g(A(D)) be the distribution of future events that depends on A(D). Let w i be the player i's utility for future events. Since A is ǫ-differentially private, g • A is also ǫ-differentially private. Thus, for random variables y ∼ g(A(D)) and y ′ ∼ g(A(D ′ )) and event b,
D i is used in the mechanism, otherwise the utility is p i . We assume that all players are rational and want to maximize their utilities. A mechanism is a direct mechanism if the action set equals the set of all real numbers. That is, a direct mechanism asks players to report their costs. A direct mechanism is truthful if every player reports his true cost in order to maximize his utility. Truth telling is a concept defined for direct mechanisms. In this paper, we propose an indirect mechanism. Thus, we want to extend the notion of truthfulness to indirect mechanisms. In our mechanism, there is a straightforward mapping, described in Section 3, from player's type set to player's action set. We say that a player decides truthfully if he picks the strategy corresponding to his type under this mapping.
In our paper, we will assume that the query/goal of the analyst is to estimate n j = |{i : D i = j}|. Without loss of generality, we assume throughout the paper that the data analyst wants to estimate n 1 . We seek to design a mechanism with the following properties.
(1) Accuracy: A mechanism M is k-accurate, if for any database D,
, when every player decides truthfully. Note that the accuracy guarantee is independent of the size of the database -the number k is fixed no matter how large the database is, or the sampled set is.
(2) Differential Privacy: The estimate and payments satisfy ǫ-differential privacy. (3) Truthfulness: A mechanism is dominant strategy truthful if, for every player, deciding truthfully maximizes his utility. A mechanism is Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) if, for every player, assuming that other players' costs are drawn from F according to their data and decide truthfully, deciding truthfully maximizes his utility. (4) Individual Rationality: If a player's utility is non-negative, then he should be willing to participate. A mechanism is ex-post individually rational (EPIR) if the utility is non-negative for every player when he decides truthfully. A mechanism is ex-interim individually rational (EIIR) if the expected utility is non-negative for every player when he decides truthfully, where the randomness comes from the mechanism and the costs of other players. (5) Payment Minimization: The summation of payments should be as little as possible.
To get permission to use a player's data, the mechanism must compensate the player by at least his perceived loss of privacy. But since costs are correlated with data, players may be reluctant to reveal their true costs, unless they will be compensated for this. To avoid this seeming chicken-and-egg problem, the mechanism designer cannot resort to the revelation principle, which states that any mechanism can be realized as a direct and truthful mechanism. In fact, [Ghosh and Roth 2011] prove that if costs and data can be arbitrarily correlated and player's cost of privacy can be unbounded, then for any k < n/2, no k-accurate, direct, dominant strategy truthful, EPIR, privacy preserving mechanism exists. On the other hand, we give a mechanism that provides k-accuracy for any input value k when costs are correlated with data, and there is no bound on players' cost of privacy. We get around the lower bound of [Ghosh and Roth 2011] by using an indirect mechanism, and modeling the correlation of values and data via publically known (and allowably unbounded) distributions.
Privacy Issues when Costs are Correlated with Data. The objective of a privacy preserving mechanism is that the increase in knowledge about a player's data due to output of the mechanism is small. Previous work on privacy in statistical databases assumes that the mechanism is associated with the database, such that the mechanism can access the whole database without compromising a player's privacy. How-ever, if the mechanism is separated from the database, then a player might not trust the mechanism and might not want to reveal private information to the mechanism.
In our problem, in order to estimate n 1 , the mechanism should learn information about players' data. Suppose that the mechanism has a prior belief G about the data in D. That is, the mechanism believes that the probability of
according to the prior belief. The mechanism learns about D i if the mechanism believes that Pr[D i = j] = Pr G [D i = j] after running the mechanism, for some j. There are two possible ways to learn about players' data. The first way is to read D i explicitly. The second way is to read players' actions and deduce something about their D i . For example, if the mechanism is direct and truthful, then the players report v i truthfully. Suppose that the prior belief is that every player's data are drawn from a uniform distribution. That is, Pr G [D i = j] is the same for all i and j. If F j (v i ) < F j ′ (v i ) for some j and j ′ , and player i truthfully reports v i , then the mechanism's posterior belief is that
, which is different from the prior belief. Learning anything about a player's data may compromise a player's privacy and should be compensated. Thus, there are two kinds of cost to a player that should be compensated, one is for using the player's data and one is for learning about the player's data.
For the latter cost, we propose the concept of perfect data privacy, which is inspired by the concept of perfect objective privacy introduced in [Feigenbaum et al. 2010] . A mechanism satisfies perfect data privacy if whenever the mechanism's posterior belief about a player's data differs from its prior belief, the mechanism pays the player. Under perfect data privacy, mechanisms can learn about a player's cost, as long as that knowledge does not reveal anything about his data. However, for a perfectly data private mechanism, if the mechanism learns about a player's data, then the mechanism always compensates the player, even when the mechanism does not not use the player's data to compute the estimate.
Our Main Contribution. We give a mechanism that is BIC, EIIR, O(ǫ −1 )-accurate, perfectly data private, and ǫ-differentially private. To achieve our privacy guarantees, we propose a posted-price-like mechanism, described in Section 3. Given the set of types of players and the distributions of costs, the mechanism writes a contract that offers a different expected payment for each type. Each player is offered this contract. If a player accepts the contract, then his payment is determined by his verifiable type and the payment for his type in the contract. The player's action is either to accept the contract or reject the contract. A player decides truthfully if a player with type j accepts the contract when ǫv i ≤ r j , where r j is the payment for type j in the contract. We prove that this posted-price-like mechanism is BIC, EIIR, O(ǫ −1 )-accurate, perfectly data private, and ǫ-differentially private.
We seek a mechanism with a small payment. In Section 4, we define a benchmark for the expected payment of a mechanism and compare the expected payment of our mechanism to this benchmark in two different settings. When costs are non-negative, we show that our mechanism is close to the benchmark.
We also prove a lower bound on the accuracy that a direct and data private mechanism can achieve in Section 2.
Related Work
Selling Privacy. Our paper is closely related to the privacy preserving mechanisms studied in [Ghosh and Roth 2011] . In [Ghosh and Roth 2011] , they extend the definition of ǫ-differentially private algorithms to ǫ-differentially private mechanisms. Under their definition of an ǫ-differentially private mechanism, the randomness only comes from the mechanism. In our model, since we want to protect the privacy of the costs, which are drawn from distributions, our definition of an ǫ-differentially private mech-anism relies both on the distributions of the costs and the randomness of the mechanism.
Differential Privacy. A comprehensive survey of differential privacy appears in [Dwork 2008 ]. Most of the previous results are based on random perturbations of the output, and assume that the mechanism has the ability to access the whole database. If the mechanism cannot access the whole database, Chaudhuri et al. [Chaudhuri and Mishra 2006] and Klonowski et al. [Klonowski et al. 2010] show that random sampling is enough to ensure differential privacy with high probability. That is, it is not necessary to add more noise to the output. Tal war 2007] use a privacy preserving algorithm as a tool to design an approximately dominant strategy truthful mechanism. Instead, we focus on treating senstive data as a commodity that can be sold.
Differential Privacy and Mechanism Design. McSherry et al. [McSherry and

Privacy Concerns in Mechanisms.
Traditional mechanism design theory focuses on drawing private information from players in order to compute a result. However, if players have privacy concerns, they may not want to reveal their information. Feigenbaum et al. [Feigenbaum et al. 2010 ] study how to quantify the information leakage to the mechanism based on communication complexity.
Xiao [Xiao 2011 ] quantifies the information leakage in a mechanism based on information theory. In his model, the outcome of a privacy preserving mechanism not only motivates the players to participate but also protects the private information of players. In independent work, Nissam et al. [Nissim et al. 2011] and Chen et al. [Chen et al. 2011] consider privacy issues in mechanism design in the context of elections and discrete facility location.
Posted-Price Mechanisms. In a posted-price mechanism, player i is offered a price r i . If player i accepts that price, then i pays r i to get the allocation. Goldberg et al. [Goldberg and Hartline 2005] show that the posted-price mechanism is collusion resistant. Moreover, the players do not need to know or report their private values precisely. They only decide to accept or reject the price. Chawla et al. [Chawla et al. 2010] point out that this could be useful in reducing the private information revealed to the mechanism.
Revenue Maximization in Bayesian Mechanism Design. In a classic paper, Myerson [Myerson 1981 ] characterizes the optimal BIC selling mechanism to maximization the expected revenue. In procurement mechanisms, each player is a supplier and each player's production cost is private information. The auctioneer is the buyer and wants to minimize the expected payment. In the computer science literature, an early paper in this area characterizes the minimum-cost dominant strategy truthful auction to buy an s-t path in a graph [Elkind et al. 2004] . Since then, there has been considerable interest in both frugal mechanism design (buying a feasible set at low cost), and budget-constrained mechanism design (buying as good a set as possible subject to a budget). Our work can be seen as a generalization of these questions to the setting of bidders who are reluctant to reveal their costs, and the feasibility of a set depends on the private costs (via the correlation with data).
MODEL AND LOWER BOUND
Model
There is a database D ∈ [h] n and n players, where each player has data D i . Player i with D i = j has a private cost v i drawn from a distribution with cumulative distribution function F j . Note that this definition is different from the traditional definition of a Bayesian setting. In the traditional definition, the distribution of v i is known to every player and the mechanism. In our definition, the mechanism and players know that each player's v i is drawn from one of a set of distributions, but the particular distribution depends on the individual player's data, which is unknown to everyone but that player.
The goal of our mechanism is to estimate n 1 based on D and determine the payment p i for every player i. A mechanism first specifies the set of possible actions Y that players can take. Then, based on players' actions and the database, the mechanism determines the estimate and payment. Formally, a mechanism is a function
The mechanism has an a priori belief G about the data in D. That is, the mechanism believes that the probability of
Recall that the mechanism learns about D i if, after running the mechanism, the mechanism believes that Pr[
n to indicate whether the mechanism learns something about each player's data. If the mechanism learns about D i , then x i = 1. A mechanism is perfectly data private if, when x i = 1, player i's expected payment from the mechanism is at least ǫv i . We focus on randomized mechanisms in this paper, that is, x i and payment p i are random variables.
Next, we define the utility for a player. If x i = 1, there is a cost ǫv i to player i, since something about D i is learned. For y ∈ Y n representing all players' actions, the utility
. In this paper, we assume that players are rational, so players want to maximize their expected utilities. The strategy of player i is a function q i : R × [h] → Y mapping from v i and D i to an action. Since players want to maximize their expected utilities, they will take the action that is not worse than any other action.
Finally, we introduce the solution concept. A profile of strategies q 1 , . . . , q n is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium if for all i, v i , and y
, where the randomness is from the mechanism and the randomness of v −i . A direct mechanism is Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) if q i (v i , D i ) = v i is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for every player i.
Lower Bound
In order to ensure that players have incentive to participate the mechanism, we wish that the mechanism is individually rational. However, we can show that for any direct, BIC, and EIIR mechanism, there is a lower bound of accuracy. Since the condition of EIIR is weaker than EPIR, the lower bound for EIIR also implies a lower bound for EPIR mechanisms.
LEMMA 2.1. If the functions F i are arbitrary functions with unbounded range, then for any k < n/2, no k-accurate, direct, BIC, EIIR, and perfectly data private mechanism exists.
PROOF. Suppose that M is a BIC, EIIR, perfectly data private, and k-accurate mechanism. First, we show that M must access at least one player's cost or data. Assume that M does not access any cost or data. Thus, M randomly output an estimateŝ, which is independent of costs and data. For a database D 1 with all entries equal to
But the summation of these two probabilities is greater than one, which is impossible. Hence, M must access at least one player's cost or data.
Suppose that D i ∈ {1, 2} and
and M is perfectly data private. Let x i be the indicator random variable representing whether player i's cost is accessed. Let p j be the random variable representing player i's payment. Since M is BIC, we suppose that players other than i report truthfully. Since the mechanism decides to access
is independent of v i . Because M must access at least one player's cost, we can find a player i, such that Pr[
Since the range of F is unbounded, we can find another v
Thus, player i can increase expected utility by overbidding. Hence, M is not BIC.
Our mechanism, which is explained in the next section, is an indirect mechanism since it does not ask for players' costs. The revelation principle, which states that if there exists an indirect mechanism implementing a function in Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, then there also exists a direct BIC mechanism implementing the same function, is irrelevant under the desire for perfect data privacy. It is easy to construct a direct mechanism from our indirect mechanism. However, this direct mechanism accesses all players' data without compensating all players. Thus, this direct mechanism is not perfectly data private.
ǫ-Differential Privacy. The traditional definition of ǫ-differential privacy compares the outcomes of the algorithm applied to adjacent databases. However, with a mechanism that offers payments, the mechanism may use both the database and the replies to the mechanism to compute an estimate and payments. Since replies depend on the individuals' costs, we compare the outcomes of the mechanism applied to two cost-data Bayesian Assumptions. Our definition of ǫ-differential privacy is based on the common belief F . That is, the player decides his strategy assuming that other players' costs are drawn from F and all players believe this assumption. If a player allows his data to be used, then he may incur a expected cost ǫv i . The expected cost to the player depends on ǫ and thus also depends on the common belief F . Having a common belief is a traditional assumption in the Bayesian setting. Moreover, most BIC mechanisms become meaningless when the common belief is not true. Thus, we assume that the common belief F is correct.
MECHANISM
In this section, we give a perfectly data private, BIC, EIIR, ǫ-differentially private, and
To start, we assume that F j is continuous for j ∈ {1, 2}.
The mechanism designs and offers contracts to players. The contract guarantees an expected payment to each player who accepts the contract. The players decide to accept or reject the contract. Thus, the possible actions for players are "accept" or "reject". The mechanism uses the data of players who accept the contract to estimate n 1 . The estimate is unbiased if the expected value of the estimate is n 1 . To obtain an unbiased estimate, the set of players who accept the contract should be unbiased, that is, the probability of a player accepting the contract should be equal for all players. Moreover, since the mechanism pays players, the costs of players in the accepting set should be bounded.
The mechanism first finds α j for j ∈ [h], such that F j (α j ) = c, where c will be determined later. Then, each player i is given a contract : "If D i = j, your expected payment will be ǫα j ." A player i with D i = j decides truthfully if, when v i ≤ α j , player i accepts the contract and rejects otherwise. Let W be the set of players who accept the contract. If all players decide truthfully, the cost to each player in W is bounded by max j α j . Since for player i with D i = j, Pr[v i ≤ α j ] = c, every player accepts the contract with probability c. Thus, W is an unbiased and cost-bounded sample set.
Since the probability that a player accepts the contract is c, the value m := |{i ∈ W : D i = 1}| is a random variable bin(n 1 , c) from a binomial distribution 2 Bin(n 1 , c). Since the expected value of m is cn 1 , m c is an unbiased estimate of n 1 . We say m c is a naïve estimate of n 1 .
We explain how to produce an estimate that satisfies ǫ-differential privacy. Although the naive estimate is an unbiased estimate of n 1 , it does not satisfy differential privacy. . Thus, we should introduce a random noise to the naive estimate to satisfy differential privacy.
The mechanism uses the Laplacian distribution as a source of the random noise. The Laplacian noise is commonly used to obtain differential privacy. A Laplacian distribution with mean 0 and parameter b > 0 is denoted by Lap(b). The probability density function of Lap(b) is
Let lap(b) denote a random variable drawn from Lap(b). In order to make estimate satisfy differential privacy, the mechanism adds random noise lap( ) is an unbiased estimate of n 1 . However, s might be larger than n or be negative, both of which are meaningless. We truncate s to getŝ, that is when s > n, the mechanism outputs n and when s < 0, the mechanism outputs 0.
We also use the Laplacian noises to produce payments that satisfy ǫ-differential privacy. By the construction of the contract, for any player i with D i = j who accepts the contract, the mechanism pays player i for ǫα j in expectation. If the mechanism pays player i for ǫα j deterministically, then an outsider can infer player i's data easily. Thus, we should introduce noise to the payments. We add noise ǫ lap( γ ǫ ) to the payment, where γ := | max j α j − min j α j |. Thus, p i = ǫ(α j + lap( γ ǫ )). Since the expected value of lap( γ ǫ ) is zero, the expected payment of player i is ǫα j , which satisfies the guarantee in the contract. Moreover, since ǫα j is larger than ǫv i , the mechanism is EIIR. The formal description of the mechanism is in Mechanism 1. LEMMA 3.1. Mechanism 1 is perfectly data private.
PROOF. Let y i be player i's reply to the contract. By construction of the contract, if i decides truthfully, then Pr[
That is, the probability of accepting the contract and D i are independent. Thus, for any i, the mechanism cannot learn about D i by reading y i . Moreover, the mechanism only reads 2 A binomial distribution with parameter n and p is denoted by Bin(n, p). The probability density function of Bin(n, p) is f (k; n, p) = n k p k (1 − p) n−k . Let bin(n, p) denote a random variable drawn from Bin(n, p). The expected value of bin(n, p) is np and variance is np(1 − p).
Mechanism 1: ǫ-differentially private mechanism input : privacy parameter ǫ; cost distributions Fj, j ∈ [h] output: estimateŝ; payment p 1 Pick a real number c ∈ (0, 1) 2 Find αj for all j ∈ [h], such that Fj (αj) = c. 3 For each player i, offer a contract:
4
If Di = j, the expected payment will be ǫαj . 5 Let W = {i : i accepts contract}. 6 Let m = |{i ∈ W : Di = 1}|. D i , where i ∈ W . Since player i ∈ W with D i = j is paid ǫα j in expectation and v i ≤ α j , the mechanism satisfies the requirement. PROOF. Without loss of generality, we assume that 1 = D i and
w be two random variables, which are equal toŝ andŝ ′ when v −i = w. Ifq w andq ′ w are ǫ-mutually bounded for all w, thenŝ andŝ ′ are ǫ-mutually bounded, since then
The case Pr[ŝ ′ ∈ I] ≤ e ǫ Pr[ŝ ∈ I] can be shown by a symmetric argument. Here, we show thatq w andq 
PROOF. Without loss of generality, we assume that
∈ W , the payment is zero. If j ∈ W , the payment to j depends only on the data D j and does not depend on the set of players receiving payments. Thus, p j does not change and we only need to consider p i . Note that p i = 0 only happens if player i is in W . If p i = 0, then p i is a random variable P 1 = ǫ(α 1 + lap( γ ǫ )). Thus, for any I ⊆ R \ {0}, the probability Pr[p i ∈ I] = c Pr[P 1 ∈ I], where c is the probability of that a player accepts the contract. The probability Pr[ PROOF. Since the error term |ŝ − n 1 | is smaller than |s − n 1 |, we can analyze |s − n 1 | to get a bound on the error. Since
In order to prove that accuracy with high probability, we use Chebyshev's inequality. We set k = √ 3 and let X ∼ bin(n 1 , c) + lap(
This is equivalent to
Thus, Pr |ŝ − n 1 | ≥ 3(
The mechanism can pick c freely. If the mechanism picks a constant c such that
ǫ 2 c 2 , the mechanism is O(ǫ −1 ) accurate. We will extend this result to general data entry and discrete cost distributions in Section 3.1. Thus, we have the main theorem. THEOREM 3.9. Mechanism 1 is BIC, EIIR, O(ǫ −1 )-accurate, perfectly data private, and ǫ-differentially private.
Extensions and Computational Issues
General Database Entries. Suppose that the entry of database has d attributes, that is,
, the data analyst wants to estimate |{i :
Then, we can apply the mechanism to estimate the number of players with
Discrete Cost Distributions. When F j is a discrete probability function, the major difficulty is that for a given c and j, we may not find a suitable α j , such that F j (α j ) = c, because the cumulative probability function of a discrete distribution is a step function. However, the mechanism can provide different contracts to different players and this ability allows us to design a mechanism for discrete case. The basic idea is that the mechanism uses randomness to pick α j such that every player has equal probability c to accept the contract. For a given c and for each j, if there is no α j such that F j (α j ) = c, then the mechanism finds the largest α . Player i is given a contract "If
, where the randomness is over the distribution of costs and the random choice of α j . We can prove that the mechanism is perfectly data private, BIC, and EIIR by arguments similar to those in the proofs of Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2. Since every player has equal probability c to accept the contract, we can show that the mechanism satisfies ǫ-differential privacy of estimate and is O(ǫ −1 )-accurate by arguments similar to those in the proofs of Lemmas 3.5 and 3.7. In order to satisfy differential privacy of payments, we let γ := max j α
Then, the payments satisfy ǫ-differential privacy by an argument similar to the proof of Lemma 3.6.
Cost of Mechanism.
For a fixed ǫ, when c increases, the accuracy of Mechanism is improved, since Mechanism 1 uses more players' data. However, Mechanism 1's expected total payment also increases. Since Mechanism 1 is 3(
ǫ 2 c 2 )-accurate, there is a trade-off between the accuracy and the expected total payment. Since the mechanism can pick c freely, for a given ǫ > 8 n , the mechanism can pick c =
Let α = max j α j . The expected total payment is ǫαcn = αn(
). Then, Mechanism 1 picks a suitable ǫ, such that the expected total payment ǫαcn = B. Hence, the mechanism is budget-feasible in expectation and is O( Computing F −1 (c). In an ideal model, when F j is a continuous distribution, we assume that mechanism can access the closed form of F j , such that the mechanism can compute α = F −1 j (c) accurately. However, when the mechanism cannot access the closed form of F j , F −1 j (c) may not be computable. When it is impossible to access the closed form of F j , we assume that there is an oracle, which returns F j (v) for any given value v. In the oracle model, the mechanism finds α
> c, and α + j − α − j < δ for δ < 1/n using binary search. Then, the mechanism uses the method that we use for discrete cost distributions to construct the contract. That is, let β j = c−c
, where the randomness is over the distribution of costs and the random choice of α j . Hence, the mechanism is still perfectly data private, BIC, EIIR, ǫ-differential private, and O(1/ǫ)-accurate. In the oracle model, the expected payment for player i with D i = j who accepts the contract is at most α + j . In the ideal model, the expected payment for player i with D i = j who accepts the contract is F −1 j (c), which is smaller than α
is at most δ < 1/n, the difference between the expected payments in the ideal model and in the oracle model is at most 1/n for each player. Thus, the difference between the expected total payment in the ideal model and in the oracle model is at most 1.
OPTIMALITY
In this section, we define a benchmark for the expected payment of a mechanism and compare the expected payment of Mechanism 1 to this benchmark in two different settings. The benchmark mechanism is not only truthful but also knows D i for all i and has no privacy requirements. We show that when all costs are non-negative, Mechanism 1 is provably close to the benchmark.
The benchmark is the minimum expected payment among all truthful mechanisms M * that satisfy the following properties. In order to get a meaningful estimate, for any k < n/2, a k-accurate mechanism learns a subset of players' data. We call this subset a sample set. Since obtaining an estimate based on an unbiased sample is a common approach in statistics, we assume that M * uses an unbiased sample. Suppose that there are n j players with D i = j for j ∈ [h]. Since the sample set is unbiased, there exists c such that M * buys w j = cn j data from players with D i = j. After getting an unbiased sample, M * uses w 1 /c as the straightforward estimate of n 1 . Since the choices of c may effect the accuracy guarantee, we compare the payment of Mechanism 1 to the payment of M * , where Mechanism 1 and M * have the same size of sample sets. Thus, M * is a truthful mechanism that gets an unbiased sample with size cn for a fixed number c.
Since there is no competition between players with data j and players with data j ′ = j, M * can run auctions for players with D i = j for all j ∈ [h] independently and buy w j data from players with D i = j. The mechanism that guarantees buying w units is called w-unit procurement mechanism. Thus, M * is a mechanism that runs a truthful, w j -unit procurement mechanism for each j ∈ [h].
Mechanism 1 buys in expectation w j data from players with
. We compare the expected payment of Mechanism 1 for buying in expectation w j data from players with D i = j with the expected payment of M * for buying w j data from players with D i = j for each j. If the expected payment of Mechanism 1 is at most r times the expected payment of M * for each j, then the total expected payment of Mechanism 1 is at most r times the total expected payment of M * . Thus, we focus on a single auction that all players have the same D i and both Mechanism 1 and the M * want to buy w data from n players.
For multi-unit procurement mechanisms, let x i be the indicator random variable denoting whether the mechanism buys from player i. Let v i be the cost to the player i, if x i = 1. Let p i be the payment of player i. The utility for player i is p i − x i v i . Note that when we consider privacy preserving mechanisms, the utility of player i is p i − ǫx i v i . However, since ǫ is the same for all players, we can ignore ǫ without loss of generality, that is, scaling every player's cost by ǫ. Without loss of generality, we suppose that players report costs v 1 ≤ v 2 · · · ≤ v n .
Envy-free Benchmark
A mechanism is envy-free if for all v and for all i, j, p i − v i x i ≥ p j − v i x j . We show that for any envy-free, multi-unit procurement mechanism, every data that is bought by the mechanism is purchased at the same price. Suppose that a multi-unit procurement mechanism buys data from two players at two different prices. Since the player with the lower price wants to have the higher price, the mechanism is not envy-free. We compare the expected payment of Mechanism 1 with the expected payment of the optimal, envy-free, dominant strategy truthful, multi-unit procurement mechanism. We use envy-free mechanisms as a benchmark, because for procurement mechanisms in a Bayesian setting, the optimal mechanisms are known to charge a fixed price. 3 We introduce another commonly used solution concept as follows. A profile of strategies q 1 , . . . , q n is a dominant strategy equilibrium if for all i, v i ,v −i , and y
, where the randomness is from the mechanism. A direct mechanism is dominant strategy truthful if q i (v i , D i ) = v i is a dominant strategy equilibrium for every player i. The following lemma characterizes the total payment for any dominant strategy truthful, EPIR, and envy-free mechanisms. Let F be the cumulative distribution function of players' costs, that is, F (a) = Pr [v ≤ a] . By Lemma 4.1, the total expected payment of any dominant strategy truthful, EPIR, and envy-free w-unit procurement mechanism is at least wE v∼F [v w+1 ]. Thus, our benchmark is wE v∼F [v w+1 ]. Now, we compare the benchmark with the expected payment of Mechanism 1. There are two cases. First, when there exists α such that F (α) = w n , Mechanism 1 offers a posted price α for each player in order to buy w players' data in expectation. If player i accepts the price, the mechanism buys from player i with expected payment α. Since each player has probability w n to accept the contract, the total expected payment of Mechanism 1 is wα.
Second, when there is no α such that F (α) = w n , we give an extension to Mechanism 1 in Section 3.1. The extension finds the largest α − and the smallest α + , such that ber larger than α − with non-zero probability. Let v (i) denote the cost of player i. If 
Anti-regular Distributions
In this section, we compare the expected payment of Mechanism 1 with the expected payment of the optimal BIC, multi-unit procurement mechanism. We first characterize randomized BIC procurement mechanisms. For a randomized mechanism and a given bid v i , letx i (v i ) be the probability that the mechanism buys from player i and let p i (v i ) be the random variable denoting the payment for player i, where bothx i and p i 's randomness come from the mechanism and v −i . Suppose that when v i = ∞, the mechanism will not buy from player i. That is,x i (∞) = 0 and E[p i (∞)] = 0. The characterization for the BIC, procurement mechanisms is analogous to the characterization of BIC selling mechanisms, which is a well-known result in auction theory. 
To prove the optimality of selling mechanisms, Myerson [Myerson 1981 ] introduces a virtual value function. The analogous function for procurement mechanisms is a virtual cost function, which is φ(z) := z + A distribution F is anti-regular if F satisfies Assumption 1 and φ(z) is increasing in z.
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When the distribution F is anti-regular, [Elkind et al. 2004 ] characterize the optimal dominant strategy truthful mechanism to minimize the expected payment for path auctions. Although their problem is not exactly the same as w-unit procurement mechanisms, their result can be extended to procurement mechanisms easily. LEMMA 4.5. When the distribution F is anti-regular, the optimal BIC w-unit procurement buys from the w players with the smallest virtual cost.
Since φ(z) is increasing in z, the optimal mechanism buys from the first w players. By Lemma 4.4, the expected payment for player i ≤ w is v w+1 . Thus, the total expected payment of the optimal BIC mechanism is wE v∼F [v 
General Distributions
When the distribution satisfies Assumption 1 but φ(z) is not increasing in z, buying from the w players with smallest virtual cost may result in a non-truthful mechanism. We can use the ironing procedure, which is designed by Myerson [Myerson 1981] , to resolve this issue. For a fixed cost vector v, ironing procedure irons on interval [a, b),
, which is drawn from the distribution F on [a, b). By a way similar to Myerson's method, we can identify a set S of intervals, such that the ironed virtual cost functionφ(z) = E[φ(z)] is increasing in z. Moreover, for an ironed interval [a, b),φ(z) is the same for all z ∈ [a, b).
LEMMA 4.7. The w-unit procurement mechanism that buys from the w players with smallest ironed virtual cost and breaks ties uniformly at random is the optimal BIC mechanism when the distribution satisfies Assumption 1.
Thus, our benchmark is the expected payment of the optimal BIC mechanism, M , when the distribution satisfies Assumption 1. In order to calculate the expected payment of M , we specify the payment rule as follows. Letx i (v i , v −i ) be the probability that M buys from player i, where the randomness comes from the mechanism. Since M buys from the w players with smallest ironed virtual cost, There are two sources of randomness in mechanism M . One is from the cost vector v since v is drawn from a distribution F . Another one is M itself since M is a randomized mechanism. For a fixed cost vector v, let p There are three cases. Case 1: v w+1 is not in any ironed interval. Since M chooses the w players with smallest ironed virtual costs and the ironed virtual cost is increasing, M buys from the first w players. For player i ≤ w, if v i increases to t < v w+1 , by the monotonicity ofφ, the mechanism still buys from player i. That isx i (t, v −i ) = 1 for all t < v w+1 . When t > v w+1 , the mechanism will not buy from player i. Thus, by definition of the expected payment, the expected payment for each player i ≤ w is v i + . Let l 1 = |{i : v i < a}| and l 2 = |{i : v i ∈ [a, b)}|. Thus, l 1 < w and l 1 + l 2 > w. The mechanism always buys from the first l 1 players. Sinceφ(t) is the same for all t ∈ [a, b) and the mechanism breaks ties uniformly at random, the mechanism buys from player i, l 1 + 1 ≤ i ≤ l 1 + l 2 , with probability w−l1 l2 . For player i ≤ l 1 ,x i (t, v −i ) = 1 if t < a. By definition of the expected payment, the expected payment for player i ≤ l 1 is v i + ∞ vix i (t, v −i )dt ≥ v i + a vix i (t, v −i )dt = a. For player i, l 1 < i ≤ l 1 + l 2 , when v i increases to t < b, sinceφ(t) is the same for all t ∈ [a, b), the probability that the mechanism buys from player i does not change. That is,x i (t, v −i ) = ≥ wa ≥ wb/r ≥ wv w+1 /r.
